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Introduction 
	  
Is it justifiable for the liberal democratic state to grant exemptions from laws of general 
applicability to beliefs which are religious and culturally based? In which instant is it 
considered an overstep by the state to try and reconcile inequalities through ‘special rights’? 
Clearly neutral laws of general applicability are bound to disadvantage some people over 
others. Laws prohibiting drugs for example, will have a disproportionate impact on people 
who use drugs, while it will have no effect on people who do not. This seems reasonable 
enough, but what is the just thing for the state to do when someone claims that she needs 
access to certain drugs as part of her religion or culture? Is this a sufficient reason to argue 
that the law itself is unequal? Should an exemption be made in order to satisfy this person’s 
religious obligation? Should the person adapt her beliefs in compliance with the law? Or  
should the law perhaps be repealed altogether?  
 
A number of liberal political theorist have aimed in answering these kinds of question in the 
context of the multicultural state,  where a number of different cultural groups form the 
society. The peculiarity of liberalism is that it has often been used to address issues in a 
homogeneous state. Whether liberalism is compatible with multiculturalism is a task which 
has preoccupied a number of different theorists, and thus advancing a liberal theory of 
equality within the multicultural setting is not an easy task. In the modern conception of 
liberal democracy which its key characteristic is a plethora of values adhered to by citizens, 
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religious and cultural affiliations are just some of the many ways people seek to find meaning 
in their lives.  
 
To defend the thesis that religious and cultural exemptions are not justified, I begin, in the 
next section, to formulate the case for looking at what egalitarian theories tell us about 
compensating things that either fall in the ‘chance’ or ‘choice’ category. Then an account for 
what counts as a choice is examined before looking at how claims of conscience are a 
particular kind of preference. The third section then turns to develop the case for 
accommodating policies. Kymlicka’s account of culture as context of choice will be outlined 
and criticized in contrast with what his account is vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  religious and cultural exemptions.  
Bhikhu Parekh’s arguments for cultural sensitivity in regards to respect, equality and the law 
will be examined, and how a lack of cultural relevance in these factors leads to significant 
‘moral loss’ to the individual. The next section looks at the concept of universal 
egalitarianism through the writings of Brian Barry, and his ‘Rule and Exemptions’ approach 
will be examined in order to demonstrate how the  ‘no exemptions’ approach is a more suited 
approach to the issue of exemptions. Then the issue of religious versus non-religious (or 
cultural) claims will be examined, in order to identify whether the difference in treatment 
account for a privilege on the part of the religious and cultural exemptions. It will be argued 
that religion and culture are being unfairly privileged in today’s legal system at the expense of 
other secular claims. In order to reconcile these inequalities, I fist look at a solution which 
suggests the room for exemptions should be expanded to all claims of conscience, before 
rejecting it for pragmatic reasons. Finally the thesis will defend that a ‘No exemptions 
approach, except exemptions which are not burden shifting’ is the most adequate response to 
deal with the exemptions debate in today’s multicultural society.   
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Typologies	  of	  Exemptions	  
As an essential prerequisite to conducting an investigation into the justification of 
exemptions, it is first necessary to clarify precisely what is meant  by exemptions for the 
purposes of this paper. Jacob Levy in Multiculturalism of Fear defined exemptions in the 
following way. He says that exemptions are individually exercised negative liberties granted 
to members of a religious or cultural group whose practices are such that . . . neutral law 
would be a distinctive burden on them (Levy, 2000; 278). This definition allows us to isolate 
the peculiar characteristics which will be used in this thesis. It also raises the following 
important questions. On what basis are exemptions granted? Should exemptions be granted to 
groups or individuals? The difference underlined in the way exemption claims are carried 
may give rise to different implications which consequently might lead political philosophers 
to different conclusions as to whether these are allowed from an egalitarian perspective.  
Exemptions can be classified into three categories, namely: 1) exemptions through individual 
claims, 2) exemptions through group differentiated rights, and 3) exemptions through group 
rights. The first category includes claims made by individuals against the generally applicable 
law. An example of this form of exemption would include an individual claiming an 
exemption from the seat-belt law because of a heavily injured shoulder. In order for her to 
claim this exemption she would not really have to show allegiance to any specific culture, or 
prove to what extent this law reduces her capacity for equal opportunities. The second 
category is exemptions through group differentiated rights. Both individual rights and group 
differentiated rights are individual. However the distinction is made because individual 
claims, unlike group differentiated claims, do not derive their objection towards the law to a 
specific culture or religion. Group differentiated rights include the exemption for Sikhs to not 
abide by the helmet requirement law when operating a motorcycle. Although this law is 
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theoretically applicable to Sikhs as a whole, it is considered a group differentiated right 
because the exemption is granted on the level of the individual, and not to the Sikh 
community in its entirety. The third category includes exemptions granted to groups as a 
whole. An example of this would be the self-governing rights given to Aboriginals in 
Australia, or the exemptions given to Amish in the U.S. regarding withdrawing their children 
from Public education.   
 
The exemptions which this thesis is centrally concerned with are ones which pertain to the 
‘Freedom of Religion’ and ‘Freedom of Conscience’. In many cases, especially in the U.S., 
the same debate regarding religious/cultural exemptions is grounded on the ‘Freedom of 
Religion’ clause. The Amish for example, when excluding their children from the public 
educational system, do not so through the language of exemptions, but rather through the 
‘freedom of religion’ clause that is embedded in the U.S. constitution.  
The distinction between ‘Freedom of Religion’ and ‘Freedom of Conscience’ is crucial 
because as we shall see, calling for an accommodating policy which allows for exemptions 
for religious claims, could still fail to meet the egalitarian standards. This is so because such 
policy initiative may favour certain groups over others. Exemptions derived from religious or 
cultural reasoning are much more pervasive and substantive than exemptions granted for any 
other claim of conscience. However, one could make the claim that religious or cultural 
claims of exemptions should be granted under a utilitarian premise, since most of the 
exemption requests have to do with conflicts deriving from the general applicable law and 
religious claims of conscience.  
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Chapter 1: Egalitarianism and compensating inequalitie 
Which	  theories	  of	  equality	  talk	  about	  exemptions?	  	  
This has been known as the ‘equality of what’ debate. Should the right be prioritized over the 
good? Or should the good dictate the way exemptions should be distributed? 
A number of different approaches can be used in order to strengthen or weaken the claim for 
exemptions. For example, by taking on the prudence view of justifying exemptions, one will 
find that the claim is not based on grounds of equality, rather on grounds of political stability. 
From this standpoint exemptions act as justified inequalities rather than a method to secure 
equality (Shorten, 2010). Brian Barry takes a similar stance when he describes exemptions 
from neutral law as ‘anomalies to be tolerated’ (Barry, 2001; 51). By this logic exemptions 
contravene egalitarian demands, but are a necessary evil to the extent that removing them 
might lead to a greater alienation of the minority (Barry, 2001; 51). However, a number of 
dominant theories of equality are using the language of exemptions in an attempt reduce 
inequalities between different segments of the population.  This is the main reason why the 
exemptions/accommodations debate is a very controversial one. Formal equality, through 
equality of citizens under universal application of general applicable law is being 
compromised for the sake of a different kind of equality. This alternative form of equality is 
not based on the ‘one rule for all’ model, but rather one which takes into account culture, 
religion, and  identity of people and the paths they seek to follow. Distributive justice theories 
have to do with how the allocation of rights and resources should be distributed among the 
society.  Any argument in support of minority rights and exemptions is usually funneled 
through a ‘distributive justice lens’. A key issue which is at stake is whether culture and 
religion can be interpreted as being part of people’s conscience ‘choice’, or part of ‘unchosen 
circumstances’.  
	  	   	   8	  
Unchosen	  circumstances	  versus	  choice	  	  
How do we defend the position of that religious and cultural affiliations are part of one’s 
unchosen circumstances, rather than choice? Does such an endeavor  entail that 
accommodations that cannot be justified?  This can be done by asking the question of what 
egalitarianism requires vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  people’s decisions. In order to do this, an analysis is required 
of the arguments used the connect expensive tastes and religious cultural affiliations as well 
as looking at the dimensions in which they are distinct. This is because arguments which 
support the claim that religious or cultural exemptions should not be granted, often invoke the 
assertion that beliefs and practices are a matter of choice rather than unchosen circumstances.   
Dworkin rightly identified the way in which changes in circumstances can affect decisions 
regarding how to best interpret an action. The perception of natural disasters, which have 
catastrophic effects in some parts of the world, can no longer be supported by the arguments 
that it was caused by either demons or other superstitions. Once we came to acknowledge that 
these events cannot be controlled by the people affected, the “whole network of our moral and 
ethical convictions changed” (Dworkin, 2002; 287). Thus, our morals convictions are intrinsic 
to on our ability to distinguish on this very complicated dichotomy as the burden of 
responsibility usually falls within the category of ‘choice’ rather than unchosen 
circumstances. As Dworkin (2002, 287) puts it, “Individuals should be relieved of 
consequential responsibility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute bad 
luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing form their own choices”.  
 
We are faced with two types of inequalities. One type invokes inequalities which arise due to 
circumstances beyond the control of individuals or groups. A person who is born blind for 
example, finds herself disadvantaged relative to the rest of the society out of no fault of her 
own. An egalitarian accommodating policy based on luck egalitarianism would argue that 
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compensations are justified for this particular person. The second type of inequality relates to 
inequalities which arise out of people’s choices. Luck egalitarianism assumes that choices 
made by rational people should be respected, and therein people should bear the resulting 
burden of their own actions as well as enjoy the fruits of their own labour. For example, if a 
person invests all of her money in the stock exchange, in the hope of acquiring a greater 
return, and the company he invested in went bankrupt, it is clear that the inequality on her part 
is due to her own action and therefore does not deserve compensation.  
Claims	  of	  conscience	  as	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  subjective	  preference	  	  	  
Taylor and Maclure defend the claim that core beliefs and commitments should be 
accommodated because they are different than expensive tastes or preferences. Part of the 
justification they use for the distinction is that they form a central part of the believers identity 
or character, therefore they should be taken into account when the general law is being 
applied. They argue that “the more a belief is linked to an individuals’ sense of moral 
integrity, the more it is a condition for his self-respect, and the stronger must be the legal 
protection it enjoys” (Taylor & Maclure, 2011; 76). The more powerful grip the belief has on 
a person mental wellbeing, the stronger the case for protecting it by accommodation. Michael 
McGann also supports this claim by saying that beliefs different from preferences in the sense 
that their non-fulfillment can endangering a person’s self-respect (McGann, 2012). Two 
conditions are put forward in order to determine whether an exemption should be granted. 
One being the need to prove that their beliefs actually provide meaning and direction to their 
lives. And secondly, the need to make the claim that respecting them is condition to their self-
respect (ibid; 77). In other words, they connect the power or the level of meaningfulness a 
belief has in one’s life, with an obligation (emphasis mine) by the state to accommodate these 
beliefs. If on the other hand these beliefs contribute to one’s wellbeing, but at the same time 
the opportunity cost of switching them or abandoning them is low, then these are not really 
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beliefs but preferences, and, according to Taylor & Maclure, preferences have no prima faice 
reason for accommodation.  
In order to demonstrate the different level of impact and effect which beliefs have over 
preferences, they introduce the concept of ‘moral loss’ and attach it to whenever a person is 
not able to express his beliefs. To account for the moral loss of an individual is a very 
complicated matter. It is hard to determine the root of the moral loss, the intensity of it, as 
well as the duration of it. Perhaps the Sikh who is unable to carry his kirpin to school feels an 
immense moral loss initially, but then with time adapts to the new situation in which he is 
faced. Perhaps the case is that the Sikh refuses to go to school, skipping a whole semester of 
classes.  It’s hard to determine, but within the context of generally applicable laws these 
situations shouldn’t surprise us.  
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Chapter 2: Liberal responses to diversity: Arguments in favour of 
accommodating religious/cultural minorities through exemptions   
	  
This part of the thesis outlines some of the predominant arguments used in order to justify 
group-differentiated rights. Although some of these arguments are not specifically adjusted to 
defend exemptions, the rationale of accommodating policies for cultural or religious 
minorities runs parallel with the present discussion both in the exemptions debate as well as 
the group-differentiated rights debate.  
 
A number of valid points have been laid out by theorists as to why there is a strong case for 
reconciling the inequalities of burdened minorities with group differentiated rights. 
Furthermore, a strong case is also made as to the method in which these inequalities might be 
reconciled. These arguments take cultural attachment as a point of initiation, and assume that 
people have a considerable interest in maintaining this. It is argued that universal legal 
equality, meaning universality through law, should be balanced against equality among the 
different segments of the population which can only be achieved through group differentiated 
rights.  
 
 In order for this to be achieved it is necessary to have a culturally sensitive attitude. Theorists 
who defend group differentiated rights for minorities wish to avoid the confusion which 
seems to stem from the very heart of liberalism. That is the confusion between equal and 
identical treatment under the ‘one rule for all’ rationale.  
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This section evaluates the theory underlying the claim that equal treatment should be perused 
through accommodating policies. Particularly, this section will critique three claims for 
religious and cultural exemptions coming from two theorists, who argue that policies of 
recognition and accommodation are required by justice.  
 
One being Will Kymlicka’s theory of equality for minority rights. More specifically, this 
thesis criticizes the connection made between autonomy and cultural context as a path of 
meaningful choice. Furthermore, Kymlicka’s ‘Equality argument’ will be outlined and 
connected to a similar argument made by Taylor and Maclure. In addition, this thesis finds 
faults with Bhikhu Parekh’s argument for opportunity, as articulated in Rethinking 
Multiculturalism. The paper will address the reasons why these arguments have failed to 
eliminate inequalities within the group, as well as the reasons to why these may only have a 
limited success, insofar as they are attaching value to cultural context of choice.  
 
Will	  Kymlicka	  	  	  
Will Kymlicka seeks to redefine liberalism and make it relevant within the multicultural 
nature of the liberal state. He provides a list of group differentiated rights as a way to 
safeguard cultural minorities from majoritarian neglect. His approach to minority rights 
oscillates around the concept of ‘luck egalitarianism’. In his book, Multicultural Citizenship: 
A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights he stresses the importance of rectifying unchosen 
inequalities (emphasis mine) when it comes to theories of justice for minority rights 
(Kymlicka, 1995; 109). He provides two arguments which shall be analyzed here. One being 
‘societal cultures as context of choice’, and the other being ‘equality principle’. 
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Context	  of	  Choice	  as	  a	  precondition	  to	  Autonomy	  	  
 
Societal cultures acting as contexts of choice is the most prominent claim made by Kymlicka 
in order to defend group differentiated rights being afforded to minority groups within the 
liberal societies. He builds this argument by emphasizing the importance of individual 
autonomy. Autonomy is a key liberal principle and Kymlicka goes to great lengths to analyze 
his argument as to how to make autonomy flourish between and within groups. He argues that 
one of the fundamental components of liberalism is that it “ascribes certain fundamental 
freedoms to each individual” and in addition it “grants people a very wide freedom of choice 
in terms of how they lead their lives” (Kymlicka, 1995; 83). Kymlicka establishes the link of 
autonomy and choices following Joseph Raz, who in Morality of Freedom argues that the 
main condition for autonomy is having “adequacy of options” (Raz, 1986; 174). Without a 
number of choices, there would not really be a choice. Our position would be akin to that of 
the highway man, who can either choose giving his money to the robber, or risk losing her 
life. When the number of choices are too few, the possibility to of making an autonomous 
meaningful choice is diminished. Realizing this, Kymlicka proceeds by connecting the 
concept of autonomy with that of culture in order to safeguard autonomy from a potential 
erosion.  
 
 After arguing for context of choice as a precondition to autonomy, Kymlicka moves on to 
argue that culture is essential because it not only provides a range of choices, but also 
provides meaningful ones. Group differentiated rights, according to Kymlicka “secure and 
promote. . . access” to choices (Kymlicka, 1995; 83). These choices cannot be understood 
from people from other cultures, since they are part of the “shared vocabulary of tradition and 
convention” (ibid; 83). So a cultural setting is not only required to make meaningful choices, 
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but also it can also be used to understand different choices as well.  
  
The three premises which Kymlicka considers to conclude that group differentiated rights are 
an adequate response in safeguarding individual autonomy can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Autonomy is essential for  individuals to enjoy a good life and the state should engage 
in policies which promote this. 
2. Autonomy is only guaranteed through the number of options available.  
3. Cultures provide a good medium for increasing availability of meaningful options.  
Therefore: 
A. There is a prima facie reason for the state to pursue group differentiated rights  
 
Kymlicka considers cultures valuable only insofar as they provide individual autonomy. 
However, it is somewhat implied in his work that the level of autonomy is correlated with the 
number of meaningful choices. If the number of choices decrease, then there could be a 
potential threat to autonomy. Returning to Raz and the highway robber, the number of options 
are inadequate to produce meaningful autonomy for the person who is being robbed. 
Kymlicka thus is only able to conclude on the value of group differentiated policies in so far 
as he can make the link between decay of cultures and decay of autonomy.  
 
Alan Patten in Equal Recognition: The moral Foundations of Minority Rights rephrases a 
common objection to Kymlicka’s conclusion. This is the ‘particularity problem (Patten, 2014; 
75). This objection is based on the fact that Kymlicka does not explicitly state why people 
need a particular culture in order to enjoy the advantage of autonomy and thus have access to 
meaningful choices.  
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The objection stipulates that as long as there is a sufficient number of cultures to provide 
people with options, there is no need to protect particular cultures from dissimilation through 
group differentiated rights. If Kymlicka is to argue that there is a strong reason to support 
particular cultures from dissimilation, then he has to support this claim by providing 
arguments for protecting cultures qua cultures. However he does not do this as he is only 
interested in cultures as long as they provide context of choice. Kymlicka addresses this 
objection by providing a number of reasons why people have strong objections in abandoning 
their culture and integrating into an alternative culture. He finds the type of objection which 
Patten poses as akin to treating “the loss of one’s culture as similar to the loss of one’s job” 
(Kymlicka, 1995; 84). Kymlicka argues that is some cases it is impossible for people to move 
between societal cultures, and that in some successful cases the opportunity cost is too high 
(ibid; 85).  
 
This brings about the second objection to Kymlicka’s theory. How does he differentiate 
between different minority groups? Kymlicka creates a hierarchy of minority status. He 
differentiates between ‘immigrants ‘and ‘national minorities’ therefore assigning different 
group-differentiated rights to each category. Kymlicka is more willing to grant 
accommodating polices to refugees and national minorities rather than to immigrants, on the 
basis that the immigrants voluntarily give up part of their culture. But how is the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary migration made? He incites the motive factor, which 
argues that since immigrants “voluntarily” leave their country to seek work they “relinquish 
some. . . rights that go along with their original national membership” (ibid; 96). 
 
Kukathas highlights the difficulties faced in trying differentiate groups in this manner.  
He notes that many migrants do not move voluntarily, that ‘not all national minorities’ are 
	  	   	   16	  
involuntary, and that some member of indigenous populations became part of the national 
minorities by choice (Kukathas, 2003; 110). He asserts that the distinction is not as clear as 
Kymlicka argues, and since the distinction is important as to the allocation of rights, it 
weakens rather than strengthens Kymlicka’s position to argue for these rights. Whether the 
choices of migrants are voluntary, and whether they desire to preserve their old culture is 
something which Kymlicka assumes and provides no further explanation. It could be possible 
that migrants voluntarily give up their own culture, but it can also be the case that they want 
to preserve as much of it as possible. 
The distinction between migrants and national minorities is one which Kymlicka seems too 
eager to make. If we accept the premise that migrants are voluntary actors, the only difference 
between them and national minorities is that the latter group has been around for a longer 
period of time. This seems sufficient for Kymlicka to make the distinction, and thus allows 
for contrasting group-differentiated rights. Patten also objects along the same lines and asks 
whether this distinction has any moral foundation all. He questions whether it is a question of 
“luck and power” under a “first come, first serve” basis (Patten, 2014; 270). These objections 
are crucial in understanding the rationale behind Kymlicka’s approach to minority rights. He 
recognizes characteristics of different minority groups, and tries to formulate his theory 
around it.  
 
A third objection suggests that Kymlicka is taking an unnecessary step in his attempt to 
reconcile inequalities between majority and minority cultures. This is the attachment of 
culture as the only means of identifying oppression or marginalization. In doing so, he places 
all the members of minority cultures on an equal footing. Kukathas addresses this problem by 
noting that even if the Aboriginal community in Australia are, on average, worse off in the 
society than the rest of Australians, it does not follow that all aboriginals are in a relatively 
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disadvantaged position when juxtaposed with the rest of Australians (Kukathas, 1992; 123). It 
could be the case that some aboriginals are in fact better off, in terms of money and status, 
than many Australians. By demarcating them into cultural categories, Kymlicka is less likely 
to detect these discrepancies between the cultures, thus limiting his effort to reconcile these 
inequalities. In the case of exemptions, it would follow that Kymlicka is ready to grant 
exemptions and group-differentiated rights to some Aborigines, without granting the same 
rights to other Austrialians who are actually worst off in the relevant aspects.  
 	  	  
The	  State’s	  lack	  of	  neutrality	  as	  	  indirect	  discrimination	  	  	  	  	  
Three similar arguments have been articulated on this issue. It is argued that the state 
unintentionally privileges the majoritarian culture at the expense of minorities. To support this 
claim the ‘Equality argument’ as articulated by Will Kymlicka will be used as well as his 
objection to ‘benign neglect’  In addition this part  examines the ‘indirect discrimination’ 
argument as put forward by Taylor & Maclure in Secularism and Freedom of Conscience . 
Will Kymlicka argues that “responding to cultural differences with benign neglect makes no 
sense”, since government decisions on language, holidays, and symbols “unavoidably involve 
recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and 
national groups” ( Kymlicka, 1995; 108). Benign neglect means that the state should act with 
indifference towards cultures, and thus make decisions and policies which are culture-neutral. 
According to Kymlicka benign neglect “ignores the fact that members of national minorities 
face a disadvantage which he members of the majority do not face” (Kymlicka, 1995; 110). 
The argument goes that since this laissez-faire attitude does not attach cultures or religions to 
individual citizens, decisions made by the state transcend cultural differences, therefore 
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treating citizens in an equal manner.   
Kymlicka’s objection to benign neglect has to do with the fact that laws are adapted by the 
state in order to fit the characteristics of the majority population. This norm may appear 
ostensibly neutral on its face, while at the same time “producing in its application effects 
detrimental to members of a given group” (Taylor & Maclure, 2011; 73). These take the form 
of dates for Public holidays, the color or design of official uniforms, the official language 
used in courts, the curriculum they teach at schools etc. etc. Given the range of issues which 
have been adapted to fit the preferences and needs of the majority, it is very unlikely for a 
state to be neutral and have no cultural preferences what so ever. The state he argues, left on 
its own, will inevitably recognize some cultural groups. “Having adopted dress-codes that 
meet Christian needs, one can hardly object to exemptions for Sikhs and Orthodox Jews on 
the ground that they violate ‘benign neglect’(Kymlicka;1995; 114).Kymlicka therefore wants 
to reconcile this inequality by providing accommodating policies to minorities.  
The equality argument runs as follows: 
(1) Institutions of a liberal state have been adapted to fit the majority (Christian) tradition.  
(2) The majority (Christians) is already accommodated within the system. 
Therefore: 
A. Minorities are at least entitled to the same accommodations already enjoyed by the 
majority.  
 
Kymlicka argues that since neutrality is impossible, it would favour equality to accommodate 
minorities in as much as the majority is accommodated in various institutions. In order to 
protect groupings from potential assimilation, language transformation, or other types of 
reforms, he argues that some special measures must be created in order to preserve the 
survival of these groupings under the pressures of change. This resembles Alan Patten’s 
concerns regarding the tendency of the state to reproduce the values or reflect the values of 
the majority. He argues that in the lack of accommodating policies the state will: (1) 
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symbolically affirm the value of some but not all ways of life; (2) accommodated associated 
practices in a way that is not true for other ways of life; and (3) promote the maintenance and 
reproduction of some but not all ways of life (Patten, 2000, cited in Shorten, 2010; 107).  
 
Premise (1) and (2) lie on the fact that the state cannot be neutral in all regards. In some direct 
or indirect way the state will tend to favour and accommodate the demands of the majority. 
This may be justifiable, given that it would be very difficult to remove existing 
accommodating principles which states have introduced at the very first stages of their 
formation.   
 
Stuart White makes the following counter argument against the conclusion reached in (A). 
Given the fact that the majority has accommodated their religious and cultural affiliations 
within the state, two interpretations are possible. The first interpretation says that the majority 
is wrong for accommodating their religious and cultural beliefs into the system. If liberal 
democracy is to be neutral then the majority shouldn’t have its beliefs and customs 
accommodated in the system, given that minorities do not share this privilege. What would 
follow from this? According to White then the best possible solution for them is to remove 
them completely. If the majority is wrong to accommodate their beliefs, then accommodating 
other beliefs through exemptions doesn’t necessarily follow, unless recognized as the 
“second-best policy”(White, 2012; 105). Under the idea of the neutral liberal state, the right 
should be prioritized over the good. If this assumption is broken from the beginning then the 
rules should be rewritten. Take the example of religious symbols in courtrooms. In a Christian 
society there are no laws which dictate that one shouldn’t wear a wedding ring in the 
courtroom. If a Muslim judge wants to wear her hijab however, this wouldn’t be allowed due 
to the uniformity of the dress code which is required inside the court room. However, this 
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does not mean that the neutral position is for the Muslim to remove her headscarf. The state in 
this case would truly be neutral if they had a rule disallowing any form of religious/cultural 
expressions from the uniform. The reason why this rule was not implemented in the first 
place, can partly be explained by the fact that the religious symbols of Christianity are much 
more subtle and discrete, therefore making the drafting of such a rule unnecessary. During 
this time however Christians are able to enjoy their freedom of expressing their religion, by 
wearing a cross underneath their shirt or a wedding ring, while Muslims are told to remove 
their headscarves in order to respect the neutrality of the court.  	  
	  
Bhikhu	  Parekh	  	  	  
 	  
In Rethinking Multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh starts by criticizing the classical monist 
perception of the good way of life. He argues that monist tradition, from ancient Greeks, to 
Christians down to J.S. Mill, “cannot see any good outside their favoured way of life” and he 
notices the “ease with which these and other groups justified or condoned egregious violence 
against alternative e ways of life,” (Parekh, 2000; 49). He is therefore skeptical on how 
helpful traditional political theory is in dealing with cultural diversity. So Parekh is very 
cautious on any sign of moral monism, since even with the most benign intentions, the 
universality and the imposition of values is in itself dangerous. H understands culture as “the 
beliefs or views human beings form about the meaning and significance of human life and its 
activities” (ibid; 142) and therefore sees both shared human interests as well as cultural 
embeddedness as  equally important factors which contribute to the concept of equality. 	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Parekh takes the stance that uniformity through law does not take the culture-sensitive 
position which is required to account for the differences people have within their cultural 
communities. In his own words: “Equal rights do not mean identical rights, for individuals 
with different cultural backgrounds and needs might require different rights to enjoy equality 
in respect of whatever happens to be the content of their rights” (Parekh, 2000; 240). This is 
because for Parekh equality entails a “full recognition of legitimate and relevant ones” 
(Parekh, 2000; 240). Above all levels of equality, he emphasizes the importance of equality of 
respect and opportunity. In order to do this one must take the cultural background and the 
beliefs of the person into account, to empathize with them, and to enter “into his world of 
thought” (ibid; 241). For Parekh, equal respect, opportunity, and equality before the law 
should be defined in a culturally sensitive manner (ibid, 2000; 240-241). 
 
His syllogism on the cultural-sensitive account of equality may be summarized as follows: 
1. equality should not be grounded in human uniformity but rather on an “interplay of 
uniformity and difference” 
2. sensitivity to the difference is important in respects to opportunity, respect, and law) 
Therefore: 
A. Equality necessitates recognition of legitimate and relevant differences 
 
He then gives a list of examples to illustrate how opportunity, if not funneled through a 
cultural-sensitive manner is actually a ‘mute’ opportunity (Parekh, 2000; 241).  
 
i. Jewish person who is required to remove his yarmulke in school  
ii. Vegetarian Hindu who is required to eat beef as a precondition for a job 
 
Examples (i) and (ii) stress that these two people are very different as to what gives meaning 
to their lives. One is a practicing Jew and the other a vegetarian Hindu. What has contributed 
in forming their identity of the Jew is very different from the Hindu. Their ‘unchosen 
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circumstances’ in conjunction with their own individual character has contributed to the 
development of their respective beliefs. It would be unfair according to the second premise to 
dismiss or ignore these steps which have contributed in their self-development, and to 
therefore treat them in an identical manner. In order to treat them equally, according to 
Parekh, it is important to maintain a certain level of sensitivity towards these differences and 
take them into account in order identifying the appropriate egalitarian response to them.  
 
In premise (2) he makes the claim that sensitivity to differences is important in order to 
safeguard equality in terms of opportunity and. In order to make the leap from premise (3) to 
the conclusion (A) he implicitly adds another premise (3a) which runs as follows: 
 
3a. Lack of recognition or respect is tantamount to moral loss 
 
This is because, if the people illustrated in the examples did not face any kind of disadvantage 
due to their differences not being recognized, the case for (A) would weaken. The ‘mute’ 
opportunity entails that the Jewish person as well as the Hindu technically have the 
opportunity to either attend school without the yarmulke or eat beef, “but for all practical 
reasons choose not to” (Parekh, 2000; 241).Therefore, it is the lack of recognition and respect 
within the rules which makes the Jewish student unable to attend his school, although the 
opportunity has not been taken away from him. This inability, according to Parekh, “is 
cultural and not physical” however, “this inability cannot be overcome without a significant 
moral loss” although sometimes “it may be overcome with relative ease” (ibid, 2000; 241).  
 
Objection	  to	  ‘extension	  by	  analogy’:	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This brings about the objection to Parekh’s conclusion on the basis of ‘extension by analogy’. 
The extension by analogy is a method used by a number of theorists to justify their rationale 
for allowing accommodating principles. Consider for example the connection often made 
between physical disability and religious and cultural affiliations as Parekh just illustrated. An 
analogy by extension may argue that a physical disability is as much of a concern for 
egalitarians as a cultural handicap.  
In this case, Parekh proceeds to make the claim that a cultural inability can, in some instances, 
be just as bad as a physical disabilities. However, he does not provide any scale as to how this 
moral loss is accounted. Given that he admits that the inability to comply with certain rules in 
some cases can be easily overturned, why does he make the argument that since some will 
find it harder from others to comply, the solution should be to allow for exemptions based on 
religion and culture? The same argument could be used in the opposite manner. If we know 
that the cultural inability to comply with certain rules is subjective and depends on the 
individual, why not argue that it is best to remove the exemption altogether, given that there is 
a good reason for the rule, as well as the difficulties in accounting for the subjective moral 
loss faced by different individuals? In discussing the exemption Sikhs have to carry the 
kirpan, Parekh confronts the objection that non-Sikhs are discriminated in the fact that they 
do not have this right. In order to support this objection, he argues that there is no inequality 
because everybody’s religious commitments have been respected. Parekh is suggesting that if 
any other religious group had asked for an analogous exemption, it would be granted. This 
may be true, but why is Parekh placing an absolute value on the freedom to practice one’s 
religion to the fullest, given that he admits that in some instances the inability to overcome 
cultural and religious beliefs in order to comply with the rules might not be great? 
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Chapter 3: Universal Egalitarianism  
 
The most common criticisms of religious and cultural accommodations have to do with the 
distinctions they draw in the law between different citizens. This part of the paper evaluates 
arguments made against accommodating principles, by looking at the benefits of the general 
applicability of the law as well as the limitations which come as soon as the state starts to 
identify individuals as members of various groups as a matter of justice. For example, Jeremy 
Waldron asks the question of whether we “should treasure the fact that in our multicultural 
society there are many ways to spousal adultery, not just one? (Waldron, 2002; 12). A fine 
line is drawn between cultural and religious diversity on the one hand, and the ways in which 
these diversities area recognized through exemptions from the generally applicable law.  
 
Brian	  Barry	  	  	  
Barry Brian’s book Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism 
accounts for a universalistic model of citizenship. By taking a liberal approach to individual 
rights he perceives that there should be equal rights between citizens. Barry accounts for a 
	  	   	   25	  
universal human nature which can he argues underlines fundamental common characteristics 
and interests shared by all humans. By universalizing human rights, he argues that there are 
some rights which for no reason can be trumped upon.  
“The defining feature of liberalism is, the principles of equal freedom that underwrite basic 
liberal institutions: civic equality, freedom of speech and religion, non-discrimination, equal 
opportunity” (Barry, 2001; 122). He notices that autonomy is key for liberalism as, other 
things being equal, the society would be better off if the society is “widely diffused among its 
members” due to the “disposition to ask if beliefs and practices can be justified” (Barry, 2001; 
119). However, he note that it does not follow that the “state should take a its mission to the 
inculcation of autonomy” (ibid; 119). Liberalism is a theory of how states ought to behave 
towards its people. However it does not stop there, as the state is only plays a minimal role 
compared to other institutions which have an effect on people’s lives. If the liberal state 
exists, but at the same time the private sector is allowed to discriminate at will, then 
liberalism would only be able to enjoy a minimal success. So intervention and re-adjustment 
of some institutions to fit the liberal framework are essential.  
Barry takes the defining feature of liberalism, i.e. civic equality and equal opportunity, and 
argues that they should be applied to all citizens equally. By acknowledging that liberalism 
entails intervention is some cases, such as the example of the workplace, he justifies his ‘all 
or nothing’ approach to exemptions in this way. There is no room for Barry to allow for 
exemptions which have a potential of jeopardizing the equal opportunity which should be 
available to all citizens on an equal level. He does not add any specific value to diversity and 
argues that it is against the liberal principles for the state to promote diversity in the name of 
autonomy (Barry, 2001; 123-125).  
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Given this, Barry’s stance takes a liberal approach to individual liberties by advancing 
uniformity through law.  He commences by arguing that uniformity through law is by no 
means inherently unjust. All laws can be said to affect people in different ways. A speeding 
law would have a different impact on someone who just bought a Ferrari than to someone 
who drives a forty year old Lada. However, road safety regulations need to be uniform. There 
can’t be one speeding law for one brand of cars and a different one for another. The question 
which needs to be posed is whether the Ferrari driver is losing out in opportunity because of 
the greater restriction he faces because of his choice of car. If the speeding limit is 100 mph 
and his car is capable of reaching 250 mph, it doesn’t follow that he has less of an opportunity 
to speed and therefore is entitled to compensation. What follows is that the person will have 
to limit himself, given the rationality of the law. This point is crucial in the formation of 
Barry’s thesis. Namely, that equality of opportunity is an objective term, which cannot be 
affected by any cultural handicap. Once equal opportunities resources and rights are 
distributed fairly, then the difference in outcome does not necessarily equate to an unequal 
outcome.  
 
Barry’s position on this reflects from the idea that there is no prima facie reason for 
compensating ‘expensive tastes. He does not consider it legitimate to compensate people who 
prefer to drink “vintage claret” over “beer” to reach the same level of satisfaction. (Barry, 
2001; 35). By treating religious and cultural beliefs as expensive tastes, he argues that people 
do have a choice as to how much strength they attribute to each belief. By arguing that he 
prefers strawberry to vanilla ice cream, he points out that his preference is subject to chance 
given an increase in the opportunity cost of choosing something else (Barry, 2001; 36). If the 
price for strawberry ice-cream is much higher than vanilla, and Barry couldn’t afford the 
strawberry one, he would have to internally decide on how he will tailor his preference around 
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this obstacle. He by no means advocates a subsidy for his ‘expensive taste’, but other things 
being equal, he will always choose strawberry.  
 
Barry argues that liberalism is not a culturally neutral theory. Advancing the private/public 
dichotomy has implications as to who decides what to remain public and what private. 
Privatizing religion, according to Barry, “fails to accommodate all those whose beliefs 
include the notion that religion ought to have public expression (Barry, 2001; 26). Privatizing 
religion is according to Barry the only way in which different religions can be given equal 
opportunities. Just like the speeding law, laws of general applicability will inevitably have 
different impacts among different religions. One of the victories of liberalism is that it has 
achieved in privatize religions. The religious wars of the 16th and 17th century had destroyed 
Europe and an appropriate response was necessary in order for toleration to be achieved 
between religious segments. Multicultural policies which aim to go against the victories won 
by the enlightenment movement could very well jeopardize the progress which has been 
made.  
 
However, it could be said that this argument attacks Barry’s thesis instead of defending it. As 
already mentioned, the state has several ways to hide the biases against religious minorities. 
The law against the ritual slaughtering of animals for example will have no impact on 
Christians, while it will have some impact upon people of the Jewish and Muslim Faith. This 
unequal outcome that the law will have on different religions has nothing to do with the right 
to exercise one’s religion to the fullest. It just so happened that Jews and Muslims were 
affected the most, because of the categorical demands that their religion ascribes. Barry 
makes little effort to attack the ‘built in injustice’ argument, which states that the majority 
have already incorporated their religious and cultural practices into existing law, therefore 
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excluding the case for an exemption since their preferences are already accommodated 
(Kymlicka, 1995) (Shorten, 2010). This limits Barry’s critique of multicultural policies, as his 
arguments for not allowing further exemptions can be immediately countered by arguing the 
‘State’s lack on neutrality’ argument, as analyzed in chapter 2. However Barry is more than 
willing to allow for existing exemptions to continue. In his ‘pragmatic cases for exemptions, 
he acknowledges that deviations from rules can be justified if it is for the benefit of social 
relations and stability (Barry, 2001; 51). He gives a number of examples to illustrate this such 
as Sikhs working in the construction business and for religious clothing from schools (Barry, 
2001; 49, 61).  So Barry’s stance cannot  be seen as a strictly ‘all or nothing’ approach, since 
compared to Kymlicka and Parekh, he just seems to disagree on the mere numbers of 
exemptions that thus far have been allowed, and is skeptical about furthering this scope to 
include additional exemptions based on religion and culture.  
 
Barry’s	  “Rule	  and	  Exemption	  Approach”	  
Barry’s ‘Rule and Exemption’ approach can be used in order to decide whether this law is 
prima facie unjust towards these religious groups, and by extension allow for compensations. 
Barry is not convinced that tolerating minority groups entails granting them exemptions to 
neutral laws which would not otherwise be granted. In his own words, Barry looks at the 
rationale behind both laws and exemptions and concludes that “either the case for the law is 
strong enough to rule out exemptions, or the case that can be made for exemptions is strong 
enough to suggest that there should be no law anyway” (Barry, 2001; 39). Barry seems to find 
no intermediary path between having the law without exemptions, or having no law 
whatsoever. The argument goes that when exemptions are granted to a certain degree, then the 
objective of the law potentially gets undermined. What good will the law do if everyone who 
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can claim an exemption will most likely have it granted? If exemptions are granted to a 
degree higher than a specific threshold, then the case for the law gets undermined. 
 
The only way for Barry to accept that there is good enough reason for the law and the 
exemption to exist is to show that: 
 
1) There is a good reason for a law to be there  
2) There is a reason for exempting some people from this rule 
3) This reason pertains only to some and not to all.  
 
These three points in combination fulfill Barry’s criteria for having both the rule and the 
exemption. Barry makes the claim that religious and cultural reasons for exemptions rarely 
pass these criteria in order for the exemption to be made.  
 
 This part uses Barry’s reasoning, to see how Barry’s responds to the claim that exemptions 
should be made for religious reasons on the use of ritual slaughter. Firstly to take premise (1) 
in relation with the exemption in question. What is the case for the law against ritual 
slaughter?  Barry cites the reports conducted by various animal welfare committees which 
concluded that ritual slaughter causes a greater degree of pain and suffering to the animal 
(Barry, 2001; 40-42).  This justification is good enough for the rule once enough information 
is available regarding the welfare of animals.  
 
Now the point comes where Muslim and Jewish people seek an exemption from this rule (2). 
In order for the rule and exemption approach to be accepted, the people seeking exemption (2) 
must show that they have a good enough reason to seek an exemptions from that law, which 
is only justified in its affordance to them. If the reason for an exemption was applicable to all, 
and not just some (3), then the strength of the law would weaken, and Barry would argue that 
the law should be repealed.  
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Barry argues that the neutrality of the law derives from the fact that it does not aim at 
infringing religious or cultural liberty per se. It just so happens that some religions/cultures 
are affected to a greater extent than others, given the requirements of their beliefs. In the case 
of the ritual slaughter this means that since there is no obligation for Jews and Muslims to eat 
meat, the law on itself does not burden their religious conscience. He supports this claim by 
pointing out to the examples of Sweden and Switzerland, where the law had passed in 
banning ritual slaughters. The religious authorities in that case eased the strictness of their 
faith by saying that pre-stunned meat was also acceptable for consumption. The alternative 
choice is one offered by Peter Singer, who argues that meat consumption is a luxury of its 
own (Singer, 1993). Given that there is no requirement for Jews or Muslims to eat meat, the 
choice for people who really feel that ritual slaughter is important is to cut back on meat 
altogether. Given that Barry doesn’t find a sufficient reason to grant (2) and (3), he says that 
the exemption is not just.  
 
Multiculturalist theorists (Kymlicka; 1995, Parekh; 2000) argue that cultural preferences play 
an important role in determining (3). That is to say, they identify which ‘some’ are worth the 
exemptions and which do not. As the second chapter illustrated, the definition of ‘some’ (of 
premise (2) & (3)) varies greatly in relation to which aspect of human interests one is willing 
to prioritize. Luck egalitarianism would prioritize the ones who are oppressed out of no fault 
of their own. Barry would agree with this insofar as physical disabilities are considered. He 
would not agree with the premise that physical disabilities have equal weight as conscientious 
objections to general applicable laws, as he does not agree with the premise that the 
opportunities of the culturally disposed are being reduced. “Justice and freedom of religion do 
not require exemptions form generally applicable laws simply on the basis of their having a 
differential effect on people according to their beliefs” (Barry, 2001; 171).  
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Sikh	  Exemption	  debate	  	  	  
 
This is the well-known example which has attracted the attention of a number of political 
philosophers. It is often used an as example because of unique characteristics which make it 
easy to generalize from. Firstly, it’s a paternalistic law, meaning that the state is restricting the 
liberty of its citizens for their own good. Unlike other liberty limiting principles, such as the 
harm principle, legal paternalism is usually excluded by liberals. In cases of legal paternalism, 
it follows that the justification used by the state must be stronger than any other type of law. 
Helmets have been noted to reduce the chance of head injury upon a crash. If the state has 
seeks to increase the welfare of its population by reducing the potential of head injuries or 
death, then this rule is justified. In addition, the only known case for exemptions for helmets 
are given to Sikhs, meaning that exemptions to a neutral law of general applicability have 
been granted for religious/cultural reasons. These make it an ideal example to examine, and 
see how the different egalitarian theorists respond to this exemption. The UK passed a law in 
1971 which required all motorcycle drivers to wear a helmet. This had a significant impact on 
the Sikh population of the UK, and a number of Sikhs had refused for some years to wear a 
helmet as a sign of protest. This had led the parliament to grant an exemption on the rule 
based for Sikhs as to allow for them to practice their religion to the fullest.  
 
Barry’s stance on this issue finds its initial foundation in off the ‘Rule and Exemption 
Approach’. According to Barry there is a prima facie reason to argue that the state is justified 
in restricting its citizen’s liberty. Since the debate involved a religious community, namely 
Sikhs, the discussion revolved around the concept of freedom of religion and the way in 
which religious beliefs can be expressed. Barry argues that it was unnecessary for the debate 
to be skewed in the direction of religious liberty. The categorical demands of the Sikh faith 
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doesn’t require Sikhs to ride motorcycles, meaning that there is no obligations that Sikhs 
should ride motorcycles. The law simply asks that if one decides to ride a motorcycle, she 
should wear a helmet. Accommodating principles are supposed to relieve the burden carried 
by marginal members of society. Barry’s concern for equal opportunities though, does not 
entail that an exemption should be made here. For this reason he emphasizes on the difference 
between ‘denial of equal opportunities’ on the one hand, and ‘choices people make from a 
certain set of equal opportunities (Barry, 2001; 45). It is important to note that Barry is 
supporting accommodating principles in so far as they have to do with physical disabilities or 
economic disadvantage. His objection to the exemption in this case derives from the idea that 
religious affiliations are similar to expensive tastes, and that a case for an exemption from a 
neutral law of general applicability for this reason cannot therefore be justified.  
 
Barry overemphasizes the obligation people have to obey the law. He does argue that this is 
only the case when there is a good enough reason for the law to be there in the first place, but 
this does not suffice. His universalist approach to liberal theory explicitly argues that there is 
“a single best way for human beings to live”  and this follows that if there are strong enough 
reasons of doing something then “culture is no excuse” (Barry, 2001; 258).  Barry’s approach 
is limited to the extent that he does not address the counterargument developed on Chapter 2, 
namely that the neutrality of the state towards religious minorities is often skewed causing 
religious minorities to be victims of majoritarian neglect. This would significantly undermine 
his premise on the moral duty of citizens to obey the law, given that the formation of the law 
could have been done in order to accommodate majoritarian demands. 
 
Parekh on the other hand defends the exemptions given to Sikhs. He says that the state is 
willing to compromise on the issue of the helmet if two conditions were met. One being that 
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the alternative head-gear should provide adequate protection, and secondly that making this 
choice makes you responsible for additional injuries caused by this alternative head-gear. In 
his own words: “such an arrangement respects differences without violating the principle of 
equality, and accommodates individual choice without imposing unfair financial and other 
burdens on the rest of their fellow citizens” (Parekh, 2000; 244). Let’s examine Parekh’s 
arguments more closely. Firstly, he disagrees with Barry on the point that the turban does not 
provide adequate protection. However this is neither here nor there. What is important is the 
two conditions offered by the British state make no specific reference to culture or respect for 
difference. It just says that it will tolerate a different head-gear on the conditions that were 
mentioned. Namely that it offers adequate protection, and that people take responsibility for 
the extra risk which they take upon themselves. Parekh claims that this exemption is 
supporting his theory of making the law subject to cultural differences, however it is evident 
that if it were not for the two provisions, the case for an exemption would be much weaker. It 
is not evident how Parekh would justify the exemption to Sihks without the supporting 
argumentation of adequate protection and the additional responsibility.  
 
But surely the two conditions made by Parekh are so vague that pretty much any form of 
headgear could pass the test. It is not clear why he needs to further support this decision by 
providing culture sensitive arguments in order to defend the exemption.  
Let’s contrast the exemption to Sihks with a similar non-cultural conscientious objection to 
wearing a helmet. Imagine that the motorcycle gang ‘Hell’s Angels’ might also prefer to ride 
their motorcycle without the interference of the helmet. Living life on the edge and 
experiencing the full capacity of motorcycling is very important to the persona of Hell’s 
Angels. The law passes which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear a helmet, and Hell’s 
Angels find that law burdensome towards their way of life.  
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How would Parekh respond to this? Given the two provisions outlined for the Sihk example, 
adequate protection and additional responsibility, it is possible that Barekh would allow this 
exemption. However, in order for Barekh to make this claim, he would have to argue that the 
Hell’s Angels claim has the same standing as the Sihks. Following Parekh’s line of thinking, 
as long as Hell’ Angels are voluntarily putting their selves in harm’s way by deciding not to 
wear the helmet, then an exemption can be made for them. This conclusion regarding the 
exemption would not violate equality in Parekhs terms. If one group can argue that its actions 
will only affect the individual members of the group who take the burden of this risk, then the 
same could be argued for the Hell’s Angels example, where the same risk would be welcome 
by them in order to live rich fulfilling lives with the wind blowing through their hair. 
 
However, it does not necessarily follow that this would be the case. A potential counter 
argument by Parekh could be that there is something special about Sihks and their way of life 
which is absent in the case of Hell’s Angels and therefore the exemption should be given to 
the former but not to the latter group. In order for him to do this he would have to 
differentiate the claims along the lines of what Ronald Dworkin labeled as experimental and 
critical interests (emphasis mine) (Dworkin, 1993; 201). Experimental interests refer to things 
which “we like the experience of doing them” and are “essential to a good life” (Ibid; 201). 
Examples of these include watching movies, taking a long walk, watching sports etc. On the 
other hand you have critical interests, which are identified as “interests which make life 
genuinely better to satisfy, interests they would be genuinely worse off, if they did not 
recognize (ibid; 201).  
In order to make the claim that it is consistent to argue for an exemption for the Sihks and not 
for Hell’s Angels, Parekh would need to argue that the Sihhks desirability not to comply with 
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the helmet law and keep the turban is part of their critical interests. It is required for them, if 
they are to live fulfilling lives as true Sihks, that they do not reveal their hair, while Hell’s 
Angels enjoyment of the motorcycle with the wind blowing through their hair is merely 
experimental interest, meaning that it still gives them fulfillment and enjoyment, but it is not 
as essential to their well-being as critical interests would be. This would suffice to make the 
distinction clear, but it still leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, at what 
point do experimental interests become critical interests? Hell’s Angels might have endorsed 
this way of life, and plan to live by the biker’s ‘code’ for as long as they live. The non-
religious element of their bond could be strong enough for them to act as if they belong to the 
Hell’s Angels culture.   
 
If the distinction between experimental and critical interests is possible, then I allow 
exemptions for this reason, but I think it is hard to make the distinction given the post-secular 
nature of the world and the immense ways in which people find meaning. Critical interests 
should be reconstructed to allow for a greater ranger of possibilities in which people 
collectively find meaning in their lives. Vegetarianism is a good example which can be used 
to further support this claim. It would be quite difficult for people to argue that vegetarianism 
is part of someone’s critical interests up until some years ago. Before Singer and the 
‘mainstrimization’ of ideas regarding animal liberation, the vegetarian would find herself in 
the same position as the lone eccentric. It would be hard for vegetarians to seek for 
exemptions in the prison system or in the workplace. However, if a collectivization or a 
movement of vegetarians came together, then the moral ground in which they can argue from 
strengthens, as they would increase their chances of recognition.  
 
	  	   	   36	  
Barry would argue that the law should be removed altogether. If the argument may be made 
in favour of individuals taking the risk upon themselves regarding various cases where the 
state suggests otherwise, then there is no reason for the law to begin with. On the other hand, 
this argument can expanded to the extent that any libertarian reasoning can be used by anyone 
to seek exemption from this law. If religious and cultural affiliations as such have no 
authority to argue for an exemption on their own, then following this line of thought 
concludes that any conscientious objection should be regarded in equal footing. Having said 
this, equal footing does not necessarily entail equal chance of granting exemptions.  
 
There is a another argument, the libertarian argument, which finds its place within the 
writings of Jeremy Waldron and Chandran Kukathas. This shifts the burden of justification 
towards the authoritative power, namely the state. Waldron asks the question of “which 
regime of regulation should prevail” (Waldron, 2002). Waldron does a good deal in 
reminding us that the norms regulating behaviour and customs exist well beyond the one set 
up by the state. Cultural societies, religions and customs may have impacted and influenced 
people’s behaviour way before the state made its existence. It is therefore reasonable to argue 
that the state needs more justification to coerce, rather than the individual to be exempt from a 
law. Chandran Kukathas in the Liberal Archipelago  uses skepticism towards authority to 
argue that the state has the potential to be far more dangerous than any subgrouping which 
might even restrict the freedoms of its own populations. By prioritizing toleration over 
autonomy, Kukathas makes it clear that the “most seductive and dangerous move in politics is 
that move which asserts identity to be not political but, somehow, natural or original.” 
(Kukathas, 2003; 90).  
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He challenges the premise in which other liberal theorists have initiated from, that is, the idea 
that “justice should be the first virtue of social institutions” (Kakuthas, 2003; 263). This is 
because he understands that through different cultures, religions, and geographical location, it 
is not feasible at this stage to have a homogenous view on justice. Liberal justice as the 
answer to the issue of diversity could potentially create more conflict than solving it for the 
simple reason that even the concept of justice is too diverse and hard to isolate. In this sense, 
the case for exemptions can have as much if not more rational basis as a form of justice, since 
the state’s motives and interests for pushing forward coercive laws which come in conflict 
with people’s conscience can be brought into question.   
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Chapter 4: Differentiating between cases for exemptions  	  	  
 
This chapter looks at ways in which differentiating between claims of exemptions lead to 
inequalities. Defending the thesis which argues that equality entails granting exemptions for 
cultural and religious reasons does not necessarily address the question of how to deal with 
claims which are outside the religious/cultural domain. Without addressing these different 
aspect of exemptions, an egalitarian theory on exemptions may only be half complete, since 
these discrepancies are undermined by the liberal multicultural theorists which this thesis has 
attacked Requests for exemptions from generally applicable law have usually been associated 
with freedom of religion. This is because, except cases of military conscription, there are 
rarely any exemptions granted to non-religious conscientious objections. This part of the 
thesis outlines the different methods used to grant exemptions and show that they provide ill 
effective. In addition, this part will defend the claim that a certain level of ‘protection’ of 
religious and cultural conscientious objections tantamount to privilege, therefore creating an 
inequality within the different claims of exemptions.  
 
Objections to religious and cultural exemptions should be contrasted in two ways. One would 
be the relationship between the majority’s religion versus minority religions and cultures. 
This has been analyzed through the ‘indirect discrimination’ objection raised by Taylor and 
Maclure, as well as the ‘equal regard’ criticism of Kymlicka, Parekh, and Nussbaum. As 
already acknowledged, there is the debate between already recognized and granted 
religious/cultural exemptions (which could be given to either the majority or the minority) 
and exemptions granted to non-religious conscientious objections. The idea is that egalitarian 
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approaches to the issue of religious and cultural exemptions fail to provide an adequate 
response to the objection which rests on the unfair status which religion and culture have in 
the case for granting exemptions.  
 
Brian Leiter in Why Tolerate Religion  makes two arguments regarding the puzzle of religious 
exemptions from generally applicable law. Firstly, he argues that there is no principled 
argument to defend the claim that exemptions for religious purposes qua religious purposes 
should be granted. He builds this claim by looking at what utilitarian and deontological 
traditions tell us about tolerating deviant beliefs within the state. He comes to the conclusion 
that the state has a number of different reasons to respect the private beliefs of its citizens, but 
by no means does that entail protecting religion qua religion. His argument, deriving from 
utilitarian and deontological premises, rests that the state has a compelling reason to “tolerate 
a plethora of private choices and conscientious commitments. . . but none of these single out 
religion for anything like the special treatment it is accorded in existing Western legal 
systems” (Leiter, 2013; 7). This special treatment, according to Leiter, causes inequalities 
within the existing sphere of exemptions. This brings about Leiter’s second proposition, 
namely that there should be no exemptions apart from those who do not ‘shift burdens’. 
According to Leiter, this would provide a solution to the problem of inequalities within 
existing claims for exemption  
 
Let’s look at one example offered by Taylor and Maclure in order to illustrate the problem 
which Leiter emphasizes on, before moving to what he labels as the  ‘Rousseaunian’ 
objection to exemptions. This example includes a religious and the other a non-religious 
claim for an exemption from work.  
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a) “I want to leave work at four o’clock of Saturdays because I want to avoid rush hour 
traffic”.  
b) “I want to leave work at four o’clock on Saturdays because I need to get home before 
sundown to respect the Shabbat (Taylor & Maclure, 2011; 79) 
They argue that there is nothing similar about these claims, and that one cannot conclude the 
two reasons for exemptions are of equal importance. However, the reason they are using to 
support this claim is that by acknowledging the similarities between the two claims of 
conscience would lead to a reductionist approach of boiling down freedom of religion and 
freedom of conscience, which they perceive as highly important, to freedom of thought. 
Could they use a different way of explaining what should be the case for this example, rather 
than simply dismissing case (b) as being relatively unimportant in comparison to (a)? 
Essentialism	  and	  claims	  of	  exemptions	  	  
This brings about the critique of essentialism in multicultural polices. Essentialism is when 
certain features are singled out from a given group and attributed to that group alone. An 
essentialist account of Christianity for example would say that all Christians believe in the 
holy trinity and divine revelation. These two sum up the Christian doctrine to some extent. It 
wouldn’t be irrational for someone to attach these features to Christianity. However it would 
be an exaggeration to say that  “all Christians believe in the holy trinity as well as divine 
revelation through prophets”, since this is clearly not the case. The problem of essentialism in 
regards to minority rights and exemptions rises through a “pick and choose” strategy in which 
it is convenient to use essentialism in order to make decisions on practical issues.  
Let’s consider the following example. Two people seek an exemption from working on a 
Saturday. One seeks it because he is Jewish and wishes to respect the Sabbath, and the other 
wishes to watch a football match. On its face, it seems that the Jewish person has a greater 
claim for the exemption rather than the person who wishes to enjoy a football match, given 
the general attachment of religion to identity, opportunity and conscience.  
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The example here is used to illustrate the fact that religious affiliations are considered to have 
a strong bearing in people’s conscience. So strong that they are perceived to impose 
categorical demands on their followers to act in certain ways. However, how would the 
distinction be made between different claims of conscience regarding the burden they impose 
upon followers? Suppose that the Jewish person takes his religion in a very casual à la carte 
manner, and that the football fan religiously follows his team everywhere they play, and what 
we care about is that each individual does not act in ways in which their conscience is being 
compromised. Which of the two would have a stronger claim in the exemption? This 
distinction is a very weak one, and I do not claim to equate the two, however this is the path 
we’re bound to follow if we let external actors, other than the burdened person, conceptualize 
in terms of beliefs and resources. Judges and lawmakers only have access to the scripts and 
traditions which are superficially evident in distinct religions and cultures. Essentialism 
basically gives easy access to people who can in some way link their claim of exemption with 
something which is accessible and easy to grasp.  
 
Jeremy Waldron warns us of the dangers of a society which has “both a single set of laws and 
a complex mosaic of exemptions and defenses, clustered around particular minority cultures 
(Waldron, 2002; 13). He argues that this would pave the way in which “each defendant would 
be encouraged by his lawyer to scour his past, his ancestry, and his affiliations for something 
that can bring him within the benefit of the exemptions recognized for a newly-formed 
cultural group (ibid; 13). Although the rationale of not working on Saturdays has no 
significance on its own for every other person besides Jews, it is assumed that each individual 
Jew would care more about not working on Saturday than anyone else, therefore making his 
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claim carry more weight, and therefore increasing the changes that the exemption will be 
granted.  
 
The essentialist critique of multicultural policies also addresses the fact that multiculturalist 
theorists have been too preoccupied in dealing with inequalities between minorities therefore 
neglecting inequalities within minorities. A post-multicultural critique of essentialism argues 
for example that multiculturalism  
“exaggerates the internal unity of cultures and solidifies differences that are currently more 
fluid” (Phillips 2007: 14). By allowing for exemptions on the basis of cultures, it might be the 
case that the exemptions will be granted to the more vocal and active cultures, which does not 
necessarily mean that they are the ones who deserve it most. In addition, this might bring 
about conformity to the hierarchy of the existing culture, since the exemptions might only be 
provided for as long as the culture seems to be relevant and active.  
 
Rousseauian	  worry	  about	  exemptions.	  	  
The Rousseauian Worry about exemptions derives from the idea that the laws drafted in the 
state are a legitimate expression of the common good. Following this, any deviations from the 
laws could translate into a deviation from the common good. Leiter uses this in order to show 
that some exemptions might ‘shift the burden’ of the common good towards those individuals 
who do not have a strong case for an exemption (Leiter, 2013; 99). He uses the term ‘common 
good’ or ‘general welfare’ in a loose manner. It does not follow that the laws are just, or that 
there is no moral obligation for civil disobedience if the law goes against the conscience of 
the individual. This is because the state should not purposely pass laws which burden claims 
of conscience if it’s to be consistent with ‘principled toleration’ (Leiter, 2013; 101). However, 
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in the neutral domains such as health and safety, the laws are generally drafted in a neutral 
way and in line with what the majority claims to be good.   
 
Why	  Burden-­‐Shifting	  is	  prima	  facie	  objectionable	  	  	  
The need for a distinction between burden shifting and non-burden shifting claims of 
exemptions is one which has the power to shift the whole debate on religious and cultural 
exemptions. That is to say, the categorization of exemptions should be adjusted in order to 
alleviate the inequalities which, according to Leiter, are being neglected under the current 
philosophical debate. So firstly the syllogism of Leiter will be outlined, followed by a number 
of examples to illustrate his thesis.  
Leiter’s argument runs as follows: 
1. There is a need to comply with laws in order to promote the common good 
2. Exemptions from those laws is objectionable on the grounds that it may jeopardize the 
common good (Leiter, 2013; 99). 
 
Therefore: 
A. No exemptions which are ‘burden shifting’ should be allowed for religious or cultural 
reasons.  
 
Let’s take three examples in order to illustrate this point: 
 
1. A person seeking exemption from removing his religious headwear from his Identity 
Card.  
2. An Amish seeking exemption from jury duty because of his religious faith.   
3. A Sikh seeking exemption from wearing a helmet because of his religious convictions 
to constantly wear the turban.  
4. A Jehovah ’s Witness seeking exemption from vaccinating his child.  
  
 
What do these cases have in common? All four people have their religious convictions 
burdened by the law. In order to express the full potential of their faith they seek for 
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exemptions on these neutral laws.  Burden shifting exemptions are ones which will impose an 
unfair burden to those citizens of a society who either 1) do not want to seek an exemption 
and 2) to those who do not have a reason that will be recognized as sufficient for the 
exemption to be granted.  
 
Example (1) can be labeled as non-burden shifting. This means that regardless of the number 
of exemptions given for people to wear religious headwear on their identity card (as long as it 
doesn’t cover the full face), no other citizens will receive additional burden. This, according 
to Leiter, is a prima facie reason to grant exemptions. Moreover, this exemption can be 
granted at an equal rate to all claims of conscience. A famous example of this is an Australian 
citizen who asked to wear a chef’s net on his head claiming that he follows the religion of the 
Flying Spaghetti Monster and claimed to be a ‘Pastafarian’. Granting this exemption to 
anyone who seeks it on conscientious grounds would alleviate the inequality between those 
who have been able to enjoy the exemption so far i.e. the religious orthodox, with anyone else 
who might have been rejected due to the unrecognizable and unmeasurable nature of his 
convictions. Of course, the counterargument, as would be perhaps articulated by Brian Barry, 
is that if there is not a good enough reason for the law, and if it’s easy to grant exemptions to 
it, then maybe the law should be removed completely. However Barry’s inability to make the 
distinction between burden shifting and non-burden shifting shows that he has a more firm 
stance on the uniformity of the law and would reject exemptions based on cultural or religious 
reasoning rather than differentiate the exemptions debate in the way Leiter does.  
 
For example (2) however the tables shift. The Amish (this is a hypothetical example) seek to 
be exempt from jury duty since they are already quite autonomous from the rest of the United 
States. However, the nature of the exemption here is different. In this case, you have a certain 
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percentage of the population, who by definition, will never be able to serve in jury, therefore 
making the rest of the population more likely, by a very small percentage, to take part in this. 
In addition, the Roussaunian argument would say that the solidarity of citizens in this case is 
being undermined if a group continuously seek to exempt themselves to what the U.S. 
consider to be the cornerstone of their democratic system.  Anarchists for example who have 
trouble accepting the legitimacy of the state in their conscience cannot be exempted on 
grounds of conscientious objections and will therefore be fined if they refuse to accept the 
responsibility of jury duty.  
 
Example (3) is the well cited example which this thesis has already touched upon. As 
analyzed previously, Parekh’s argument regarding self-respect and identity as motives for 
granting exemptions could only be realized when he smuggled in the extra cost which Sikhs 
must carry, namely the fact that any injury which results because of their lack of use of a 
helmet should be taken upon themselves. Parekh here unconsciously used the non-burden 
shifting principle to make his case. This becomes even more evident when the contrast 
between Sikhs and Hell’s Angels. The extra responsibility accepted by Hell’s Angels is 
sufficient to grant the exemption, since no burden gets shifted to any other members of the 
population. The distinction between burden shifting and non-burden shifting here becomes a 
bit weak in examples like this, and this is a big weakness for Leiter’s thesis. Using the 
‘common good’ argument, one could say that although the helmet exemption is not burden 
shifting per se, in a state with universal healthcare, an increase in the number of head injuries 
could shift the burden of financing the hospitals to all the other citizens, who take the 
appropriate precaution in regards to road safety. However this argument is too weak on its 
face to attack the position which Leiter put forward. The weakness of Leiter’s claim becomes 
less evident in more clear cut and relevant examples, such as (1) and (4).  
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Example (4) is a very interesting example because it highlights the fact that non-burden 
shifting examples may in time turn into burden shifting. The law for vaccinations is clearly 
one which is in the best interests of its citizens and can unarguably be said that it does 
promote the ‘general welfare’. The Jehovah ’s Witness who considers the issue of 
vaccinations as a personal choice, may argue that she is hurting no one but herself if she 
chooses not to vaccinate herself or her child, therefore the state has an obligation to respect 
her personal and religious convictions and allow for an exemption. The particularity of this 
example lies in the fact that as long as the number of people who do not vaccinate their 
children is low, then the risk of them getting ill is minimal. At this point, the people not 
getting the vaccination are ‘freeriding’ on the fact that most of the population have done so. 
As soon as the number of exemptions for this rule increase however, then it may be witnessed 
that a number of diseases might resurface.  
 
Where does all this leave us vis-à-vis exemptions?  Having shown that the non-religious and 
non-cultural claims for exemptions can be as significant as religious claims for exemptions, 
given that they rest of the freedom of conscience, defenders of exemptions would perhaps 
argue that the right response is to remove the emphasis on religion and reduce it down to 
different claims of conscience. This approach would have the benefit of removing the 
privileged position which religion and culture have in the current system of exemptions, and 
therefore treat all cases of conscience in the same manner. The next section deals with this 
claim and argues that this is not the best approach before defending a more loose concept of 
Leiter’s ‘No Exemption Approach’ in combination with Barry’s ‘Rule and Exemption’ 
approach.  
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1. Expanding	  the	  scope	  of	  exemptions  	  
Expanding the scope of exemptions could very well be the answer in alleviating the inequality 
between different types of conscientious objections. This would allow for a more inclusive 
concept of freedom of consciousness as the basis for an exemption from generally applicable 
law. However, there are number of fundamental problems with this approach. Firstly, it is 
implausible that any government would publicly endorse this. Imagine that in every neutral 
law of general applicability there was the clause which states that  “you might object to this if 
it goes against your conscience”. This would come very close to “legalizing anarchy” (Leiter, 
2013; 94). Barry would consider this claim to further support his ‘Rule and Exemption’ 
approach, since the greater the leeway for an exemption makes the law in question weaker. 
But even more so, if all claims of conscience were on equal footing, the challenge posed by 
the ‘essentialism’ objection would be too strong to fairly treat the cases. Of course this might 
not necessarily be a problem, since not all claims for exemptions would be successfully 
granted even within this expanding approach.  	  
Exemptions	  for	  whom?	  	  	  
A weakness of exemptions based on claims on conscience lays in the ‘equal regard’ principle. 
Equal regard means treating equal cases alike. While this  approach is mostly used by judges 
in the absence of a clear standard, political theorists also use this to some extent to justify 
their position on the issue of exemptions. For example, Parekh has argued that the law 
banning the use of illicit drugs in the U.S discriminates against Indians, because of use of 
peyote in rituals, and Rastafarians, because of the use of cannabis to communicate with God. 
Parekh here is willing to grant exemptions on the law prohibiting drug use for cultures and 
religions who use it (Parekh, 2000; 242). He builds the case for these exemptions through the 
different impact which laws have on people. To further justify this exemption he turns to the 
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exemption given to Christians and Jews in allowing them to use wine in ceremonies during 
the era of alcohol prohibition. Parekh here assumes that the exemption given to Christians 
followed from his own line of thinking that the Christian tradition needs to be taken into 
account and therefore adjust the rights given to them if they are to reach the same level of 
equality. Since Christians were burdened by the alcohol prohibition, it is to the best interest of 
the state to accommodate their claim. 
 
This brings about what Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager argue for in 
Religious Freedom and the Constitution. They propose an ‘equal liberty’ policy as an anti-
discriminatory principle. They ask whether a refusal of an exemption  to religious groups 
amounts to a certain level of discrimination, given the way the state already exempts  similar 
religious or secular claims. This approach, purposely fails to specify the criteria in which 
claims of exemption should rest upon. In doing so, the decision to grant the exemption is 
made on simply comparing already granted exemptions in order to reduce the discrimination 
among the claimants. They do admit that the equal liberty approach demands “consistency” 
across cases rather than “conformity to some idealized, theoretically specified regulatory 
equilibrium (Sager & Eisgruber, 2007; 91). In doing so, they search for non-religious 
analogies to strengthen their equality based approach on the issue of exemptions. 
 Let’s consider an example of the exemptions Sager & Eigruber grant using the anti-
discrimination approach:  
(1) Muslim police officers in Newark seeking exemption on uniform requirements to 
grow their beards.  
 
Example (1) concerns the claims made by two Muslim police officers, who argued that it is a 
religious requirement for them to grow their beards, and sought for an exemption from the 
rule requiring all police officers to be clean shaved. The exemption was granted by the courts 
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on the grounds that exemptions have already been made in favour of police officers who, due 
to their skin condition, were unable to shave. Sager & Eigruber sympathized with the court’s 
decision and said that “If Newark was willing to make an exemption for the special health 
needs of its officers, then it had to show equal regard for the special religious needs of its 
officers” (Sager & Eigruber, 2007; 91).They search for non-religious analogies to strengthen 
equality based idea and they resort to the analogy by extension argument, as Parekh 
previously advanced. As witnessed here, legal scholars who deal on the issue of exemptions 
use the extension by analogy in relation to physical disability with a cultural handicap and 
they do not consider this leap to be problematic. Using normative theory however, which is 
not constrained by the limits of constitutional law, can aid in illuminating this fallacy which is 
based on ‘consistency’ rather than some principle of justice.  
 
What led to Sager and Eigruber resort to conclude for (1), among other reasons,  is “the 
improbability that there would be a non-religious moral commitment to have a beard” (Sager 
and Eigruber, 2007; 96). But, by taking this assumption a priori, they immediately dismiss the 
possibility of individual claims of conscience which are not comparable or have analogous 
religious equivalence. This line of thinking is derived from a historical account as to which 
individuals tend to seek ‘dress code’ exemptions from generally applicable laws. At this 
point, it is unclear whether Sager and Eigruber accept that secular conscientious objections (to 
dress codes) are as valuable as the religious ones. They assume that secular commitments 
would not compel individuals to seek exemptions from generally applicable law on this issue. 
This however is not a normative claim which should influence court decisions, if they are to 
acknowledge the claim on freedom of conscience grounds. This is a prediction based on the 
fact that there have not been, at least successful, attempts by people to seek exemptions on 
this basis. Their argument therefore derives from the unlikelihood that one would attempt to 
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seek exemption on this ground, given the minimal chance of succeeding, and the 
overwhelming successful attempts by religiously motivated claims to exemptions. Thus, the 
equal liberty approach accommodates  religious conscientious objections based on ‘accidental 
justice’ given the way religious claims are privileged over non-religious ones (White, 2012; 
112). The removal of the emphasis on religion and culture when it comes to exemptions from 
law of general applicability has the benefit of sticking to claims of conscience. However, as 
argued, this reduction will not necessarily reconcile the unequal treatment of different claims, 
and there will still be a tendency to favour mainstream recognizable claims over others, thus 
making it improbable that the ‘claims of conscience’ will be the ones which are taken into 
consideration. The lack of tools and time for judges to distinguish between sincere versus 
non-sincere claims of conscience make it an unattractive path to follow.  
 
Brian Barry when faced with the argument of equal treatment argues that an ‘open-ended 
exemptions’ approach, one that grants exemptions on the grounds that  exemptions have been 
previously made for similar claims, will have unintended consequences. He therefore 
responds with the argument that the first exemptions shouldn’t had been made in the first 
place. In his own words: “If the argument is made that it is inconsistent to have these 
exemptions and not others of a similar kind, the answer that can be given is that the current 
exemptions were a mistake that is awaiting ratification at an opportune time, so it would 
absurd to add to their number in the meantime. Moreover, those that do exist should be 
limited as tightly as possible” (Barry; 2001; 51). To illustrate this point, Barry points to the 
example of a person carrying a 3ft-long double-edged sword during a protest in London. The 
person claimed to be the reincarnation of King Arthur, and claimed to be the “Official 
Swordbearer of the Secular Order of Druids” (Barry, 2001; 52). Exemption from the law to 
carrying knives in public was already granted to the Sikh community. Therefore, the court 
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following a similar approach to the ‘equal liberty’ approach, has granted the exemption and 
concluded that “it is not in the public interest to pursuit this claim” (ibid;52).  
 
Barry is in some way using the ‘slippery slope’ argument in order to defend the claim that the 
expansion of exemptions on religious and cultural grounds should be limited. He uses the 
term ‘vicious spiral’ in order to demonstrate how granting the exemption for carrying knives 
to the Sihks was used by Arthur in order to defend his own right to be exempt from the law 
for carrying a weapon. However Barry, although implicitly, takes into account the ‘burden 
shifting’ distinction in order to emphasize the mistake in allowing for such exemptions. 
Instead of strengthening the claim that religious and cultural reasons have no part to play in 
exemption seeking, he turns to public safety and the first premise of the ‘Rule and 
Exemptions Approach’. There is a good reason for the state to be concerned about public 
safety, hence the rule. However, since public safety is an important rule, he does not go on to 
say that rule should be dismissed altogether, given the ease for granting exemptions to this is 
somewhat more relaxed than it previously was. Instead, he argues that “you are more likely to 
carry a knife just in case you might need it if you think that others are likely to be carrying 
them” (ibid; 54). Using the ‘burden shifting approach’, Barry’s argument is that as long as 
some people are granted this exemption, the rest of society will carry an extra burden. In this 
case they will be more worried or suspicious of people because of the off chance that they are 
carrying a knife. Barry’s stance on the knife exemption is far more adamant than the 
exemption for the helmet. Perhaps Barry realizes the extra strength of the argument for 
opposing exemptions given that the exemption in question is ‘burden shifting’.  
 
2.	  Remove	  all	  existing	  exemptions.  	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Removing all existing exemptions would lead to an immediate burden of all those enjoying 
exemptions up until now. Brian Barry, who strongly favours a universal approach to laws, 
argues that there are indeed pragmatic reasons for allowing existing exemptions to continue. 
He argues that although removing exemptions, for example on ritual animal slaughter, might 
have a positive impact on animal welfare, it might have “bad effects on the social relations 
between different religious groups” (Brian, 2001; 50). This argument would not pass as an 
egalitarian argument for exemptions. Since the factor of social relations and consequently 
political stability is taken into account by Barry, this would best be identified as a prudence 
argument, A similar reason for not removing existing exemptions is offers by Martha 
Nussbaum who argues that since the majority of claims made for exemptions are done 
through the freedom of religious exercise, it follows that an immediate ban of these 
exemptions would have a disproportional impact on these religious groups, who are often 
victims of the majority’s neglect (Nussbaum, 2008; 116-120). This is unarguably true and 
perhaps there are also strong utilitarian reasons for preserving the system as such.  
 
Laborde and Boucher offer a heavy criticism on Leiter’s conclusion. They accuse Leiter’s ‘No 
Exemptions Approach’ to be “morally problematic as it does not derive from a principled 
argument” (Laborde and Boucher, 2014; 12). Leiter used a theory of principled toleration to 
defend the claim that there is no moral reason to grant exemptions to religious claims qua 
religious claims. If exemptions are sometimes justified, according to Leiter, they should be in 
theory available to all claims of conscience, both religious and non-religious alike. Laborde 
and Boucher argue that Leiter overdoes it in his effort to refute any positive valuation of 
religion, and makes this his main argument against exemptions, while at the same time failing 
to look at the strongest claims for allowing exemptions, namely through theories of equality 
freedom and inclusion (ibid; 18). In addition, they argue that the ‘burden shifting’ concept to 
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exemptions does not suffice as it is not grounded on any theory of justice. For this reason, 
they argue that the “No Exemption except for non-burden shifting exemptions’ conclusion 
which Leiter defends is a very weak one as it commits a ‘status quo neutrality fallacy’” (ibid; 
19).  
 
The approaches used by judges today in order to grant exemptions do not lie in a 
comprehensive moral account as to which claims of conscience should prevail. For this 
reason it is not unreasonable to identify the current discrepancies within the exemptions 
debate which, all intentions aside, privilege rather than protect religious claims of conscience. 
The most adequate defense of exemptions should therefore make the argument that an 
appropriate response to reconcile these disparities is not to remove exemptions altogether, but 
rather to remove the emphasis on religion and thus encompass the whole range of 
‘conscientious objections’ within the limits for claims of exemptions. This approach however 
has a number of practical difficulties, regarding how best to judge individual claims of 
conscience. Deciding on grounds of sincerity would have the benefit of treating claims for 
exemptions on a case by case basis. But this approach has proven to be problematic, in so far 
as it is easier and more convenient to grant exemptions on grounds of ‘equal regard’ or favour 
mainstream religious and cultural affiliations over more excluded ones.  
 
The main thesis of Leiter has to do with the what are the implications of the current legal 
system of exemptions and how it could be following the ‘No Exemption except non-burden 
shifting exemptions’. I find Laborde and Boucher’s accusation of Leiter committing a ‘status 
quo neutrality fallacy’ unsubstantiated. They argue that: “assuming that currently existing 
laws and institutional arrangements are already fair and constitute an appropriate baseline 
against which demands for exemptions can be evaluated from a moral point of view” 
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(Laborde and Boucher, 2014; 24). However, Leiter makes no such assumption. In fact, in his 
response to Laborde and Boucher, he goes as far as to say that many of the laws in the U.S. 
and in Europe do not in fact promote the general welfare (Leiter, 2014; 9). In any case where 
the ‘general welfare’ is in doubt, Leiter’s thesis becomes indefensible. Within the legal 
framework of exemptions in the examples that he employs, it is supporters of exemptions who 
fall into the trap of the ‘status quo neutrality fallacy’ He shows this by looking at the 
intentions in which exemptions are granted. He argues that “at least generally applicable laws 
unintentionally burden minority claims of conscience, whereas a regime of exemptions 
intentionally privileges religious claims of conscience, to the exclusion of others, even though 
there is no moral reason to do so” (Leiter, 2013; 102). The distinction between the claims of 
conscience which are burdened intentionally, and ones which are burdened unintentionally is 
a very important one. Not every claim of conscience for an exemption from a law of general 
applicability can be granted, and it does not follow from any theory of justice that it should. 
As in the criminal justice system, not all innocent people being accused can successfully 
claim their innocence. This is not an argument however of removing the process altogether. In 
this analogy the defendant, even if innocent, would have his freedom intentionally reduced by 
the state. However, all defendants would have a fighting chance. The current system, by 
favoring religious and cultural claims, will unintentionally burden all those who either cannot 
make a claim, or lack the necessary capacities language and rhetoric to make the claim. By 
putting forward the ‘No exemptions except non burden shifting exemptions’ Leiter equalizes 
this inequality, and gives members of society an equal chance to claim exemptions which are 
not burden shifting, while acknowledging that burden-shifting exemptions, on laws which 
promote the general welfare, are the cause of inequality.  
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Conclusion  	  	  
This paper has looked at liberal theories of multiculturalism and how they account for 
accommodating policies through exemptions. The arguments for culture as context of choice, 
as well as the idea of self-respect and identity, although important, cannot be used as a 
leverage to argue for exemptions. On the other hand, the indirect discriminatory principle of 
the state is a much more convincing argument for granting exemptions to minorities. 
Universal egalitarianism, as proposed by Barry, is limited to the extent that it doesn’t take this 
argument into account, and thus making Barry’s position unsubstantiated to that respect. 
However none of the above theories have been able to escape the distinction of majority-
minority religious and cultural conflicts towards the post-secular pluralistic value of freedom 
of conscience, where new values can shape one’s identity beyond the rigid cultural and 
religious context. The implications of this is for theorists to fall into the trap essentialism. 
Post-multiculturalist theorist such as Phillips, have thrown caveats for the potential 
implications which follow by following this line of thought. This trap  can only be avoided  
by shifting focus from religion and culture as the context of exemptions towards individual 
conscience.  However, the paper has shown that although this might seem like the best option, 
the number of practical difficulties associated with it are too great. Judges would be unable to 
coop with this form of expansionist exemptions based on conscience and in addition it would 
be very unlikely that a state would openly say that rules are open for exemptions given the 
conscience of its individual members. This will highly challenges the normative theory on 
accommodations and exemptions, as it is not morally defensible to distinguish one claim of 
conscience over the other. 	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